Non-Aggression Principle (or Axiom): a Libertarian Viewpoint

"...rather than have the NAP presuppose libertarian property rights, a proper theory of liberty applied in practice should entail the property rights..."

non-aggression principle (or axiom)  In human terms, an act of aggression is normally interpreted as an unprovoked (i.e., offensive rather than defensive or pre-emptive) attack on someone or their property. And this is often applied to state territories as well, although this can be confused and confusing to some extent because of the coercive collectivism involved. The non-aggression principle (NAP) is often held by libertarians to summarise, or explain, or possibly even “justify”, libertarianism in legal or in moral terms. And “aggression” is typically explained as being the “initiation of force” (or sometimes even “violence”). However, this seems to be a persuasive definition that, on closer inspection, is simplistic, hyperbolic, and confused.

For instance, such things as theft, fraud, embezzlement, and trespassing clearly flout libertarianism as interpreted by self-described libertarians. But none of these things needs to involve “force” in any ordinary interpersonal sense of that word. And they certainly need not involve any actual “violence” as that word is normally understood.

What about the “initiation” aspect of the alleged force or violence? In fact, the (private) police, etc., might well have to be the ones who literally initiate force or even violence when detaining or arresting a suspect. This is simply because that suspect need not himself have used any actual force or violence in the commission of his clearly unlibertarian crime.

Consequently, it might be thought that the general idea can be saved by asserting, instead, a “non-violation principle”. But even “non-violation” is still presupposing that it is libertarian property rights that are not to be violated rather than any other kind of property rights. And this is also without thereby saying or implying what makes those property rights libertarian.

Of course, there are also such other libertarian assumptions—or principles—as “homesteading” or “labour-mingling”, production, and voluntary exchange, which appear to imply what can be a libertarian property right. But these provide no clear account of how such property rights are libertarian: i.e., how they relate to interpersonal liberty explicitly and exactly rather than merely fitting the intuitions of libertarians (and very possibly not the intuitions of non-libertarians).

Further still, the NAP appears to be an absolute proscription—as is implied by the “non”—on such “aggressions”. But then, as has been often remarked upon, this would appear to imply that even the tiniest amount of pollution flouts the NAP. Do a few smoke particles or photons of light coming from my property to yours constitute “aggression”? Or is it somehow a matter of degree? Or is there an additional principle that determines this?

Then what of, the rarely remarked upon, mutual clashes in the NAP? For instance, if I start a fire on my property that will pollute your property, then I violate the NAP. But if you stop me from lighting a fire on my property, that I need for warmth and cooking, then you also violate the NAP. So, both this and the previous point make it look as though “aggression”—however interpreted—must at least sometimes be minimised rather than absolutely proscribed.

Given that “non-aggression” is so demonstrably and utterly confused, and thereby often confusing, it can hardly be asserted to be an “axiom” (in the apparently intended sense of being “self-evident” or generally accepted) without eliciting general mockery from all plain-speaking people. It is meaningful and useful to be able to object that something is aggressive. But that cannot be the end of any explanation or dispute concerning libertarianism.

Nevertheless, there is a grain of truth in the NAP: libertarianism does appear to imply the absence of some sort of aggression. Conceptually, liberty is always the absence of a constraint. The overall philosophical problem with libertarianism is that it requires an explicit abstract (pre-propertarian and non-normative) theory of interpersonal liberty that explains this constraint. But “aggression” in the NAP sense presupposes libertarian property, so that cannot be it.

It seems more natural and intuitive to assert the “liberty principle” to summarise or explain, but not “justify”, libertarianism in philosophical terms. This can be stated as “the absence of interpersonal initiated impositions”. But the only way to make this clearer and more precise is to explain how libertarian property becomes the practical application of minimising such initiated impositions. Thus, “initiating impositions” is also an interpretation of “aggression”, but in a more philosophical and coherent sense.

In other words, rather than have the NAP presuppose libertarian property rights, a proper theory of liberty applied in practice should entail the property rights: a Copernican Revolution. This requires some relatively complicated philosophical unpacking, which is done in various relevant entries of this dictionary. See especially 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

(This is an entry from A Libertarian Dictionary: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised].)