Liberty Maximisation: a Libertarian Viewpoint

"What are the general rules that you would be likely to accept as being initiated-imposition-minimising for yourself?"

liberty maximisation  There are three general theoretical problems with applying the abstract theory of complete interpersonal ^*liberty in itself. What are the correct libertarian responses when such complete liberty is 1) impossible, 2) threatened, or 3) infringed? The general implication is that liberty can only be maximised as far as is practical in the circumstances. But these three problems present different general circumstances.

1) What if our want-satisfactions clash? I want to do something which, unintentionally, would ^*initiate impositions on you (e.g., my starting a fire would cause you obnoxious and hard-to-avoid smoke), but to stop me would also initiate impositions on me (I want a fire for warmth and cooking). The most libertarian option is to minimise overall initiated impositions (i.e., maximise liberty), with situation-specific compromise or compensation. Thus, we see the error in assuming libertarianism absolutism: that individual liberty can always be perfect and without any infractions.

2) How far can one go to defend oneself from, potential, initiated impositions? Not so far as to initiate new ones by overall disproportionately exceeding any that are threatened (e.g., putting landmines in one’s garden to stop children from using it as a shortcut). Some degree of ^*common sense might indicate how far is ^*reasonable. But, doubtless, it is also possible that some mathematical formula might be contrived and applied to adjudicate between clashing intuitions.

3) If an initiated imposition has occurred, then what would rectify it? ^*Restitution matching the degree of imposition. This will include any proportion of ^*retributive-restitution (at the victim’s choice) plus any ^*risk-multiplier (proportional to the statistical chance of the perpetrator’s successfully evading rectification).

Such solutions might make it appear that at least some broad interpersonal comparisons of normal initiated impositions (although certainly not all ^*interpersonal comparisons of utility) are sometimes necessary to solve these problems. And, as such, they are hopelessly subjective. However, that can—at least, largely—be avoided. For it is possible to consider all of these situations in an intrapersonal way. Successively imagine yourself on each side of the various situations (as you are quite likely to be over the course of your lifetime). What are the general rules that you would be likely to accept as being initiated-imposition-minimising for yourself? Such chosen general rules are likely to be the same for all normal people.

This theoretical solution might even work for all of the tiny minority of people who are extreme outliers as regards normal want-satisfaction: the highly emotionally unstable, obsessives, the self-destructively vindictive, psychopaths, ^*utility monsters, etc. For they are also likely to have lower initiated impositions in the long run by accepting the same rules as normal people: their extreme preferences tending to cancel each other as they are on successive sides of any clash. However, if some of the outliers cannot be coherently included, then we still have a theory of liberty and its maximisation that is adequate for the overwhelming majority of people without resorting to interpersonal (dis)utility comparisons. In that case, it is not perfect even in theory but possibly the best that can be done.

Crucially, it ought also to be noticed that the three above solutions for liberty maximisation are only about conflicts in the liberty of the people directly affected (although that could be indefinitely many people). Therefore, they do not amount to ^*involuntary ^*collectivistic “libertarian ^*consequentialism” (where anyone’s liberty can be limited if it creates a greater amount of liberty for other people). In any case, a consequentialist approach to maximising liberty is liable to suffer from the local-knowledge problem and ^*perverse incentives causing self-defeating ^*unintended consequences. Thus, this is an ^*individualistic liberty-maximisation theory.

It is now possible to proceed to ^*liberty in a state of nature.

(This is an entry from A Libertarian Dictionary: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)