Liberty in Itself: a Libertarian Viewpoint
"the theory only explains complete (or perfect) abstract interpersonal liberty in itself"
liberty in itself Most *libertarians lack an explicit theory of interpersonal liberty in itself: a maximally abstract and non-normative theory; before it is applied to the world or asserted to be *valuable, *rightful, *just, etc. This situation is as absurd as it would be for most *utilitarians to have no theory of *utility in itself (in fact, they have several). But there must be a tacit theory of liberty that is presupposed, or entailed, by libertarianism. Making that tacit theory explicit is what is explained here.
“Liberty” is from Latin and “freedom” from Old English. They are usually used as synonyms and are so in this dictionary. “Liberty” is most broadly understood as “absence of constraint” (and, as such, is inherently negative). “Libertarianism”, in its political or social sense, is about the absence of some type of interpersonal constraint. There are two dominant, *common sense, general conceptions of interpersonal liberty. 1) The absence of any kind of constraint on a *person by other people. 2) The absence of an initiated constraint on a person by other people. (So-called *“positive liberty” is the presence of, *powers and *resources necessary for, someone’s—or everyone’s—self-realisation or self-mastery. This is not any coherent conception of liberty, whether interpersonal or not.)
With 1, anything that you can do that other people could not or would not prevent, you have the liberty (or freedom) to do. If other people could and would prevent it, then you do not have the liberty to do it. Such liberty is thus zero-sum: the more that Peter has, the less that Paul has. If no one could and would prevent Peter from killing Paul, then Peter has the liberty to kill Paul (whatever consequences might predictably then ensue for Peter).
With 2, anything that does not initiate a constraint on—or interfere with—other people, it is part of your liberty that you are not interpersonally constrained from doing (whether you are able to do that thing or not). If other people could and would prevent you from exercising such liberty, then they would be limiting your liberty. If you can and would prevent them from preventing you, then that would not limit their similar liberty but merely defend your own liberty. By this conception, it is no part of someone’s liberty to initiate any, unnecessary, constraint on anyone else’s liberty (which initiated constraint might usefully be called *“licence”, following J. S. Mill [1806-1873]). Such liberty is thus not zero-sum: both Peter and Paul could in principle have complete liberty without any clash.
In everyday usage, people often switch between both main senses of “liberty” without clearly distinguishing them or even noticing that they are doing this (sometimes including philosophers, and even when doing philosophy on this very subject). Confusion and unnecessary paradoxes ensue. Both conceptions of liberty can be used to explain libertarianism. However, the second one appears to be more intuitively relevant and so that is used here. The next question then becomes this: the absence of interpersonal initiated constraints on what?
Many libertarians opt first and foremost to answer this question with “(legitimate) property”. They regard this as intuitively and obviously correct. But it presents an insuperable problem. There are infinite possible property systems. How do we distinguish the libertarian one from all of the others? Surely, therefore, the libertarian one must fit what liberty is in some more abstract sense of liberty than property itself. It is no use asserting that we start as self-owners, then “mingle our labour” with unowned *resources, and thereby achieve inviolable ownership of them. That is certainly very easy to understand and might even approximately capture the correct libertarian intuition in practice. However, this simplistic approach does not provide a philosophical explanation of abstract liberty in itself or how it fits into the explanation of liberty in practice. It also gives rise to insuperable paradoxes and problems: e.g., the slightest negative *externality (such as by pollution or risky activity) would appear to be incompatible with “inviolable ownership”. So, either normal life would be impossible when observing such “liberty” or it must be limited by something else.
A better alternative is “the absence of interpersonal initiated constraints on want-satisfaction” (or, for brevity, “no initiated imposed costs” or “no initiated impositions”). Here “want-satisfaction” refers to the fulfillment of *spontaneous wants, not wants produced by *aggression or *fraud. This provides an abstract theory of liberty in itself that is what we always and most want other people to not initiate constraints on (unless some immediate restriction gives us more overall want-satisfaction: e.g., someone seizes us against our will in order to save us from being run over by a bus). This conception is not, yet, intuitive. It may initially sound more utilitarian or *welfarist than what is normally thought of as libertarian. It may also seem to be irredeemably subjective and possibly imply interpersonal utility comparisons. But upon further development and analysis it should be seen to have greater explanatory power and to withstand all obvious criticisms.
At this stage, however, the theory only explains complete (or perfect) abstract interpersonal liberty in itself. Consequently, it gives rise to four further crucial problems. 1) What are the libertarian solutions to problems involving clashes, defences, and rectifications? 2) What libertarian rules would apply in a state of nature? 3) How can we derive libertarian property? 4) What is the moral status of libertarianism? For the answers see, respectively, *liberty maximisation, *liberty in a state of nature, *liberty in propertarian practice, and *liberty and morality.
(This is an entry from A Libertarian Dictionary: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)