Liberty and Morality: a Libertarian Viewpoint

"deontologism, consequentialism, and contractarianism ... all point towards libertarian liberty in propertarian practice"

liberty and morality  The ^*philosophical theory of ^*libertarianism and its implementation in this dictionary have initially been explained in an entirely positive—or value-free—way. Therefore, it is a completely separate and normative—or value—matter whether this overall positive system is ^*moral, ^*just, ^*rights-observing, ^*valuable, etc. Only after deriving the positive account, by going through its various stages in the correct order, is it possible to ask normative questions about it without being liable to fall into confusion. (But due to the ambiguity and technicality of “normativity”, “morality” will now be preferred as a clearer and less confusing general term.)

As a result, we can now see that—strictly speaking—libertarian ^*self-ownership, ^*private property, and ^*legal remedies cannot be inherently moral, just, rights-observing, valuable, etc. (as moralised theories of libertarianism appear to assume). Otherwise, we risk conflating liberty and morality into an unfalsifiable and confused theory (or even a mere stipulative definition).

Nevertheless, correctly interpreted—both philosophically and empirically—^*deontologism, ^*consequentialism, and ^*contractarianism (the three main moral theories) all point towards libertarian liberty in propertarian practice as the outcome: the real top of Derek Parfit’s moral “mountain” (On What Matters: Volume One, p. 419: “These people are climbing the same mountain on different sides”). And yet libertarianism can, instead, simply be morally posited and defended in itself without requiring that it must follow from any allegedly more-fundamental and “supporting” moral theory.

Consequently, we can now see the hopeless philosophical conflation, confusion, and superficiality of completely ignoring any analysis of liberty in itself, etc., and beginning a book that purports to explain the philosophy of libertarianism by jumping to the assumption that, “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)” (Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p. ix).

It might still be asked whether the various stages of explanation that have been distinguished and expounded here are, or are intended to be (if only in outline), an adequate supporting ^*“justification” of libertarianism in theory and practice. And the answer to that has to be a hard “no”. For an important part of the ^*eleutheric-conjectural libertarianism that is explained in this dictionary is its, at least implicit, application of ^*critical-rationalist epistemology to every single issue. For a concise philosophical explanation of what that means, see ^*Critical Rationalism and its Application to Libertarianism.

(This is an entry from A Libertarian Dictionary: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)