Defamation claims have been fairly rare in the US recently. I’m not sure whether that means the law is working , or there is no real need for the law, or perhaps legislation has complicated the picture enough to convince potential plaintiffs that they will lose.
If I accuse you of something, does it impose less if it is true? Or is it an initiation of imposition when false, but a reaction to imposition when true?
How does the nature of the accusation affect things? If I falsely accuse someone of being a dull writer, it doesn’t seem worse than accusing them truly of a serious crime. Does this relate to liberty somehow?
>If I accuse you of something, does it impose less if it is true? Or is it an initiation of imposition when false, but a reaction to imposition when true?
This is too abstract to answer easily and clearly. At least one example is needed. Also, are you lying or is it your honest opinion? The accusation might not be an initiated imposition at all.
>How does the nature of the accusation affect things?
Again, “the nature of the accusation” is completely vague.
>If I falsely accuse someone of being a dull writer, it doesn’t seem worse than accusing them truly of a serious crime.
You don’t say whether you believe your accusations.
>Does this relate to liberty somehow?
Yes, all lies are fraudulent (an attempt to present a falsehood as being the truth). And fraud usually flouts liberty to some degree. At one extreme there might be a “white lie”. At the other there is a lie that intentionally causes someone’s death (“Those mushrooms are completely safe to eat”).
Examples might include accusing someone of being a dull writer, or of committing a serious crime like murder.
Sounds like, true/false does not determine whether it is an initiation. Believe/don't believe might make the difference, but it's hard to know if another person believes what they say, and the same damage could be done even if the imposer believes the accusation. Harm isn’t the factor, unless we are saying we can never say true things that harm someone.
Maybe lying is like violence, valid in self-defense. But what sorts of impositions make lying in response okay?
When someone is pestering me, I can say I have an appointment and need to go, rather than telling them they are pestering me and I want it to stop.
>Examples might include accusing someone of being a dull writer,
In what context? Anyway, this would generally be too trivial to count as an initiated imposition (whether it is believed by you or not).
>or of committing a serious crime like murder.
In what context? Anyway, this would generally count as an initiated imposition if you are lying to make trouble. But not if it is an honest statement made to the police.
>Sounds like, true/false does not determine whether it is an initiation.
In what context?
>Believe/don't believe might make the difference, but it's hard to know if another person believes what they say,
We always have to separate the semantic issue of what counts as an initiated imposition from the epistemological one.
> and the same damage could be done even if the imposer believes the accusation.
Yes, but then there is no fraud. It is akin to an accident.
>Harm isn’t the factor, unless we are saying we can never say true things that harm someone.
Fraud has connotations concerning a loss of something owned via deception, or loss of something to which someone is otherwise entitled. Lying to prevent loss, or regarding something to which the recipient of the lie has no entitlement, does not seem like fraud. All fraud May count as deception, but are all intentional deceptions frauds?
>Fraud has connotations concerning a loss of something owned via deception,
If I pretend to give you X but really give you Y in order to influence your behaviour, then I have defrauded you although I might not receive any physical object from you in return. X can be a truth and Y can be a falsehood.
>or loss of something to which someone is otherwise entitled.
If one loses belief in a truth because of a deception, then one has suffered a loss of something to which one was entitled not to lose by deception.
>Lying to prevent loss, or regarding something to which the recipient of the lie has no entitlement, does not seem like fraud. All fraud May count as deception, but are all intentional deceptions frauds?
To use violence in self-defence is still to use violence. To use fraud in self-defence is still to use fraud. Or so it currently seems to me. Of course, self-defensive fraud should not be criminal fraud.
You make good points.
Defamation claims have been fairly rare in the US recently. I’m not sure whether that means the law is working , or there is no real need for the law, or perhaps legislation has complicated the picture enough to convince potential plaintiffs that they will lose.
If I accuse you of something, does it impose less if it is true? Or is it an initiation of imposition when false, but a reaction to imposition when true?
How does the nature of the accusation affect things? If I falsely accuse someone of being a dull writer, it doesn’t seem worse than accusing them truly of a serious crime. Does this relate to liberty somehow?
>If I accuse you of something, does it impose less if it is true? Or is it an initiation of imposition when false, but a reaction to imposition when true?
This is too abstract to answer easily and clearly. At least one example is needed. Also, are you lying or is it your honest opinion? The accusation might not be an initiated imposition at all.
>How does the nature of the accusation affect things?
Again, “the nature of the accusation” is completely vague.
>If I falsely accuse someone of being a dull writer, it doesn’t seem worse than accusing them truly of a serious crime.
You don’t say whether you believe your accusations.
>Does this relate to liberty somehow?
Yes, all lies are fraudulent (an attempt to present a falsehood as being the truth). And fraud usually flouts liberty to some degree. At one extreme there might be a “white lie”. At the other there is a lie that intentionally causes someone’s death (“Those mushrooms are completely safe to eat”).
Examples might include accusing someone of being a dull writer, or of committing a serious crime like murder.
Sounds like, true/false does not determine whether it is an initiation. Believe/don't believe might make the difference, but it's hard to know if another person believes what they say, and the same damage could be done even if the imposer believes the accusation. Harm isn’t the factor, unless we are saying we can never say true things that harm someone.
Maybe lying is like violence, valid in self-defense. But what sorts of impositions make lying in response okay?
When someone is pestering me, I can say I have an appointment and need to go, rather than telling them they are pestering me and I want it to stop.
>Examples might include accusing someone of being a dull writer,
In what context? Anyway, this would generally be too trivial to count as an initiated imposition (whether it is believed by you or not).
>or of committing a serious crime like murder.
In what context? Anyway, this would generally count as an initiated imposition if you are lying to make trouble. But not if it is an honest statement made to the police.
>Sounds like, true/false does not determine whether it is an initiation.
In what context?
>Believe/don't believe might make the difference, but it's hard to know if another person believes what they say,
We always have to separate the semantic issue of what counts as an initiated imposition from the epistemological one.
> and the same damage could be done even if the imposer believes the accusation.
Yes, but then there is no fraud. It is akin to an accident.
>Harm isn’t the factor, unless we are saying we can never say true things that harm someone.
“’harm’ is a hopelessly confused criterion” of what can be disallowed. https://jclester.substack.com/p/harm-principle-a-libertarian-viewpoint?utm_source=publication-search
>Maybe lying is like violence, valid in self-defense.
Yes, or in defence of some other innocent person.
>But what sorts of impositions make lying in response okay?
Threatened initiated impositions that are worse than the lie? (“Are there any Jews hiding here?”, “No, sir!”)
>When someone is pestering me, I can say I have an appointment and need to go, rather than telling them they are pestering me and I want it to stop.
I try to say something that is not a lie: “I shouldn’t take up any more of your valuable time”, “Tempus fugit”, etc.
Fraud has connotations concerning a loss of something owned via deception, or loss of something to which someone is otherwise entitled. Lying to prevent loss, or regarding something to which the recipient of the lie has no entitlement, does not seem like fraud. All fraud May count as deception, but are all intentional deceptions frauds?
>Fraud has connotations concerning a loss of something owned via deception,
If I pretend to give you X but really give you Y in order to influence your behaviour, then I have defrauded you although I might not receive any physical object from you in return. X can be a truth and Y can be a falsehood.
>or loss of something to which someone is otherwise entitled.
If one loses belief in a truth because of a deception, then one has suffered a loss of something to which one was entitled not to lose by deception.
>Lying to prevent loss, or regarding something to which the recipient of the lie has no entitlement, does not seem like fraud. All fraud May count as deception, but are all intentional deceptions frauds?
To use violence in self-defence is still to use violence. To use fraud in self-defence is still to use fraud. Or so it currently seems to me. Of course, self-defensive fraud should not be criminal fraud.