Free Speech: What it is, How it is an Absolute Right, and Why it Matters

"Free speech is subject to considerable confusion: popular, political, and even philosophical"

Free speech, or freedom of speech, is one aspect of general freedom or liberty. But it is particularly important and that is why it is one of several that have traditionally been picked out for special mention. It also implies by intention, although not by logic, the freedom to hear such speech. It does not imply imposing that speech on unwilling people or being provided with a platform: each of those would constitute licence (initiated imposition) rather than liberty. Free speech is often not distinguished from freedom of expression or of communication, although those are both broader concepts. Only the traditional phrase is discussed here, but the arguments are generalisable. Free speech is subject to considerable confusion: popular, political, and even philosophical (partly thanks to state-interference with academia). As usual, the Hobbesian zero-sum conception of freedom is ignored in favour of the Lockean no-initiated-imposition conception.

If there were to be perfect free speech, then anyone would be able to say anything, anywhere, at any time without thereby interfering with anyone else. But that is clearly not practicable. Therefore, in practice, free speech (just like liberty generally) can only be individualistically maximised. And the most efficient way to achieve this (also as with liberty generally) is by tolerating the voluntary interactions of any people and property owners involved, as long as that property is compatible with liberty. For it is a huge initiated imposition to be prevented from consensual speaking and hearing within private-property boundaries (including any privately-owned broadcasting). But it is a relatively minuscule imposition, if any at all, to know or merely suspect that some people might be consensually saying and hearing things that you don’t like.

Unfortunately, while there is “public” property (i.e., state property, including any broadcasting aspects such as the notorious BBC) such free speech will often not be observed: either by speech being imposed on some people or by preventing some people from speaking. But it can sometimes be difficult to impossible to judge what the free-speech outcomes would have been if only the “public” property were to have been properly private.

Some Common Criticisms

Should free speech be limited by the “harm principle”? As the entry on that principle explains, “harm” is a hopelessly confused criterion: rather, things cease to be free when they infringe liberty. Some examples of alleged “harm” follow. But worth special mention is the woke hysteria about the “harm” caused by “hate speech”, even when fully restricted to private property. This is almost entirely self-inflicted but, in any case, actually enjoyed as an excuse for “virtue-signalling” while censoring and even persecuting people who say anti-woke things.

It is often supposed that denying people the right falsely to shout “Fire!” in a crowded theatre is a, legitimate, restriction on free speech. On the contrary, the person falsely shouting “Fire!” is interfering with the, at least implicit, speech rules of the theatre owner (who surely would not allow this). Such a shouter would be guilty of licence, not exercising liberty.

What about ordering a henchman or inciting a mob to murder someone? This is not exercising free speech either. This is using other people as tools for one’s own criminal purposes; albeit that they are tools who may also be culpable. Such behaviour is no more part of freedom of speech than stabbing someone is part of freedom of movement.

What of speaking about a company’s trade secrets? That might be precluded by contract or possibly by being stolen information that one has come into possession of with no property right to pass it on (see intellectual property [forthcoming]). In such cases, that would not be part of free speech either.

Can one speak about all dangerous information, such as how to make a bomb or poison people? There is the statistical likelihood that gratuitously spreading such information to all and sundry will eventually and inevitably result in the deaths of some people. In which case, it would count as criminally reckless speech rather than part of free speech. The knowledge of bomb-making, poisoning, etc., can also have many legitimate purposes. So not all speech on such subjects will be licence.

What of intentional false statements about people or companies? The statist line is often that slander is a harm to someone’s reputation. In response, some libertarians assert that this must be allowed because you cannot own your reputation (other people’s opinion of you). However, it seems more accurate to say that promulgating such intentional falsehoods is a fraudulent interference with other people’s liberty (on a par with telling someone that a deadly fungus is safe to eat). Any losers have a claim against the fraudster. But mistakenly to speak a falsehood does not defraud anyone. That is part of free speech. Of course, distinguishing the two cases can be a separate—epistemological and legal—problem.

Can a company become so market-dominant that it interferes with free speech if it censors or boosts some people or views? It is part of liberty that a company chooses its own rules given certain assumptions: it has no state monopoly, privileges, or funding; it is free of political pressure or enticements; it is honest about its practices; etc. But such assumptions do not seem to fit all, or even most, relevant dominant companies.

There is an absolute right to all genuine, libertarian, private-property free speech; although there will sometimes be confusing and contested cases. However, it can still be moral to interfere with that, or any, libertarian right in a sufficiently serious emergency (unlike COVID-19). But then all rights-violated persons would still be owed full restitution; thereby helping to prevent spurious or cavalier examples.

Why Does Free Speech Matter So Much?

It needs to be pointed out that free speech has nothing to do with so-called “democracy”, although that is a popular so-called “justification” of it. For it is completely compatible with real democracy for the majority to censor the speech of any minority, or commit any enormity against them. To give only one general explanation of why free speech matters, it is because it is the most efficient method for people to discover what is useful, true, or moral. Free competition among ideas is analogous to the discovery process of competition among products in the free market. But this is only one conjectured general explanation of the value of free speech (it is also a delight, for instance). It is not the “justification” that many philosophers mistakenly think is possible and required. And even if “justifications” were possible, why should we suppose that free speech requires one? It seems far more defensible to suppose that liberty should be the presumption and it is only any restriction on it that needs to be “justified”.