Morally Arbitrary Advantages

"an intended project can have unintended logical and empirical implications"

Some people have advantages that they can have done nothing to merit or deserve. For instance, no one is born with desirable genetics or into wealth because he deserves to be. Consequently, it may be asserted that, 1) it is morally arbitrary that such people have received these advantages (ignoring for now, whether one would even be the same person without the genetic ones). In any case, assume that this is true arguendo. It is then sometimes assumed that, 2) this logically implies that it is also morally arbitrary that such people are able to fully benefit from their undeserved advantages (or, perhaps more often, these two logically separable assumptions are conflated). However, there is no such second logical implication.

Consider genetic inheritance. Biologically, a human is a particular expression of his genes. He did not deserve to be born that way, or even to be born at all. But once he is born, and becomes a person, then any use of him without his consent is interfering with his interpersonal liberty (in the objective sense this dictionary explains and uses). That is at least intuitively and prima facie immoral, without needing to mention rights, justice, or even property. As a separate point, the consequences of using people in this way are to undermine general economic efficiency. This will thereby strongly tend to undermine overall human welfare; including, and even especially, the welfare of the least advantaged groups (as changes in economic efficiency have greater effects on them).

Consider inherited wealth. Such wealth is not part of what one is as a particular person. But it is part of liberty that what we own, without interfering with the liberty of others, is not to be taken without our consent. And, again as a separate point, to do so will strongly tend to undermine the economic efficiency of libertarian private property. (The philosophical and empirical compatibility of interpersonal liberty and general welfare is an aspect of eleutheric conjectural libertarianism.)

Therefore, even if it is morally arbitrary that people often receive advantages they do not deserve, it is not morally arbitrary that people be allowed to keep the fruits of those advantages if either interpersonal liberty or general welfare are morally valuable (which is not to dismiss the potential morality and efficiency of libertarian charity). The failure to understand the nature of interpersonal liberty and how it relates to property mainly requires correction from philosophy; as theorised in these dictionary entries, at least. The failure to understand the efficiency of full interpersonal liberty mainly requires correction from economics; as found in its libertarian interpretations, at least (e.g., mises.org; this dictionary aims to complement such economics philosophically rather than to explain it in any detail).

Another type of criticism is possible. Assume, also arguendo, that redistributing the fruits of such advantages is both moral and welfare-enhancing. As has often been pointed out, there seems to be no sound argument for restricting this redistribution to one country. Almost all redistribution will need to flow from the more-developed countries to the less-developed countries. And most of that redistribution will have to be taken from the poorest people in the more-developed countries: they are still relatively well off and collectively hold far more wealth than the small percentage of rich people in those countries. After all, with global trade all humans now comprise more or less one society, if not as tight and distinct as each country’s societies. So national redistributists might be disappointed (however, it is logically coherent to embrace this as a moral insight rather than a reductio ad absurdum.)

Why stop there, though? No one deserves to receive the advantages of being born a human rather than a “dumb animal”. If one accepts that being a human is usually better, then presumably there should be transfers of various kinds to the other sentient animals to compensate them—at least as far as is possible—for their undeserved disadvantages in the “genetic lottery” and “circumstance lottery”. Although other animals are not part of human society, we are all more or less interacting participants in one planetary system of sentient beings. So even international redistributists might be disappointed (however, it is also logically coherent to embrace this as a moral insight rather than a reductio ad absurdum.)

One possible response to the latter argument is that non-human animals are less-advantaged because of what they inherently are plus their complex contingent circumstances: it would be both absurd and impossible to “correct” for these things. But then the same thing can also be said of less-advantaged humans. One should either apply the principle consistently to all sentient life (and then, presumably, humans must mainly be engaged in “correcting” the disadvantages of other animals) or drop it completely. (This criticism is intended seriously, not as hyperbolic or satirical rhetoric.)

It was A Theory of Justice (John Rawls, 1971) that popularised the view that the distribution of advantageous natural and social contingencies is “arbitrary from a moral point of view” (the exact expression appears five times). Since then, much moral theorising rests on the same principle. This principle might itself be further interpreted as ostensibly implying two fundamental theses. 1) Individual human beings are not what they appear to be as regards their identities in terms of their genes and their circumstances: they are really only attribute-less “persons” at best (if even that, given that all sentient animals must be included). 2) There is a default position of redistribution as moral and welfare-enhancing: any deviations require adequate defence if they are to be tolerated. Both theses are far from obviously plausible. A Rawlsian reply might be to deny both implications, asserting that real persons are fully as they appear to be and that redistribution might not be desirable: the real project concerns determining what rules are in principle “fair” in a particular human society. However, an intended project can have unintended logical and empirical implications. Further responses to Rawlsian arguments are in entries on Original Position, Difference Principle, Justice as Fairness, and Two Principles of Justice (various types of equality are also discussed separately).

Of course, none of the above is intended to be a supporting justification of the libertarian alternative.