“Extremism”: the Fool’s Fallacious Favourite “Fault”

"In the realm of ideas there is such a great virtue in extremeness that it is often a good criticism to object to its absence"

extremism  It is one of common sense’s many confused ideas that there is something inherently dubious or even clearly wrong about so-called “extremism”. This has made the word a pejorative. It is usually intended to refer to advocating anything that is very different from what is popular, mainstream, or normal; especially in politics. It is often an accusation made by people with views inside the Overton window of popular acceptability. They are either really only pointing out that some view is not itself inside that window, or they are trying to defenestrate it by giving it that label. This is a version of the logical fallacy that is argumentum ad populum (argument by appeal to popular opinion). An “extreme” version of this fallacy is vox populi, vox dei (the voice of the people [is] the voice of god): a metaphor often implying real democracy (majoritarian rule) or the democratic theory of truth. Whichever it is, an appropriate response might be “vox populi vox poppycock”.

To the contrary, there is nothing even prima facie wrong with “extremism” as such. In the absence of any further information, an extreme position would seem to be as likely to be correct as the opposite extreme or as a perfectly central one. Moreover, what appears to be “extreme” today might well appear to be “moderate”, and vice versa, to common sense tomorrow. In the realm of ideas there is such a great virtue in extremeness that it is often a good criticism to object to its absence, at least for initial consideration. As critical rationalism explains, this is because of the epistemic efficiency of forming bold conjectures for rigorous testing instead of wasting time attempting a bogusly “inductive” or “justificatory” incremental strategy. When anyone is kind enough to provide us with an extreme theory, we should be suitably grateful and reciprocate the kindness by giving that theory the best criticisms we can manage.

However, actual aggressive violence and terrorism might also be meant as an “extreme” example of “extremism”. These things should be utterly condemned and, if possible, prevented. But they should not be condemned and prevented because they are “extreme”. Otherwise, moderate use of aggressive violence and terrorism might seem to be acceptable: surely it is also “extreme” to ban all of it (a paradox of anti-extremism). They should be condemned and prevented because they very seriously flout individual liberty. Flouting liberty is the only thing that is really unacceptable here.

Consequently, the current government’s provision of a “New Definition of Extremism (2024)” (“intended to reflect an ordinary, commonsense meaning of the word ‘extremism’”) is an act of confusion and folly. Here are only a few relevant points from that document. 1) It mentions the “extremism” of those people whose “aim is to subvert our democracy”. By “our democracy” it can only really mean the state’s system of popularly elected oligarchy. All libertarians want to subvert this, ergo they fit the category of “extremism”. 2) “Extremism can lead to the radicalisation of individuals…”. That cannot be a bad thing in itself—unless you are an elected oligarch who prefers an apathetic and pliable populace. 3) “Extremism … can lead to acts of terrorism”. Theoretically, anything that isn’t logically incompatible with terrorism “can lead to acts of terrorism”. Eating food is clearly a prime culprit here: terrorists couldn’t function without doing this. Eating must be stopped! 4) It objects to “Behaviour against a group, or members of it, that seeks to negate or destroy their rights to live … free of … discrimination”. However, mere discrimination with one’s own person and property exactly describes liberty in practice. 5) Later it says, “The lawful exercise of a person’s rights (including … freedom of expression, freedom of association, …) is not extremism”. But how are these even logically consistent with stopping those “extremists” whose “aim is to subvert our democracy” or who want to practice discrimination? The Humpty Dumpty authors of this document are not objecting to “extremism” at all. They are objecting to a hodgepodge of things they don’t like (some quite rightly; some quite wrongly) while paying lip service to some inconsistent principles. They then lump all this together under the one completely irrelevant word “extremism”.

Anarcho-libertarianism (the ideology of this book) is typically regarded by statists as an example of “extremism”.  As we have seen, that is not a valid criticism. But it might be asked whether it is even that extreme. It can, after all, be summarised as “live and let live”: a very “moderate” and tolerant social philosophy. In practice, this means the consistent protection of persons and their property from all infractions. By contrast, depriving an entire population of many of their liberties would appear to be a form of “extremism”. But that is exactly what states do by their very nature.