The State: a Libertarian Viewpoint

"A consensual or contractual state would be as analytically absurd as a 'square circle'"

state  States are what ^*libertarians mainly object to for being far and away the main violators of interpersonal ^*liberty; although libertarians are against individual violations as well, of course. To explain why, we require an adequate theory of what a state actually is (this is not a definition; although any theory can be used as a definition). This theory is that a state is a dominant ^*organisation with the perceived ^*legitimacy to initiate ^*coercion in order to ^*rule people in a specified geographical region. The state is not itself a ^*nation, a ^*country, or a ^*society. Nor is it a prerequisite for any of these things to exist. There are no services that are intrinsic to a state; not even the provision of ^*law and ^*national defence. There are various other desirable attributes that are sometimes mistakenly ascribed to the state. Some of these romanticise it to a mystical degree; see G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), for instance. They cannot all be dealt with here.

By contrast, consider the still popular account of the state by Max Weber (1864-1920): “a human community that successfully claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. This is demonstrably hopeless. 1) There is no hint that states exist in order to rule, not merely to possess ^*power. 2) The dominant organisation is not the “human community” it rules. 3) Neither is it ever set up by that “human community”. 4) That alleged “human community” is not a ^*community, in any case. 5) A state is not the single seller (“monopoly”) of anything. 6) It only requires to be perceived as “legitimate”, not to really be legitimate (which, because it is destructive and unnecessary, it cannot be). 7) It is not the sole user of “physical force” (whether legitimate or not); merely the dominant user. 8) Much coercion only requires the threat of force. 9) There is no prior, single, ^*political “territory” that is initially claimed (unless another state had already claimed that geographical region): the claim creates that region as being its territory.

By ruling, a state has ultimate control of all ^*persons and ^*property in its domain; although its ^*subjects are not thereby ^*slaves or prisoners. Consequently, states rely on a popular perception of legitimacy. This probably occurs mainly because most people wrongly assume it to be necessary that some organisation must ^*“run the country”. But they are also under the mistaken impression that the state is protecting them and providing essential services that the ^*market or ^*charity could not. These ^*beliefs constitute the various ways a state attempts to preserve its perceived legitimacy. But such general support for the state does not mean that states and their activities are thereby, at least tacitly, ^*consensual or ^*contractual; even when allegedly ^*“democratic”. A consensual or contractual state would be as analytically absurd as a “square circle” (although less obviously so). Even if an apparently state-like organisation were genuinely contracted into by all adults in some region, this could not bind children below the ^*age of majority or any ^*future generations; although they might need to leave the area in order to opt out. However, it is possible to distinguish a political ^*“government” (as the executive committee of the state) from a contractual ^*“government” (whether a home-owners’ association or one owning a large land area). The latter can be libertarian and ^*economically ^*efficient.

The origins of a state are invariably by conquest, whether from within or without the regions subsequently ^*oppressed. “War is the health of the state” in that states tend to grow larger and stronger relative to their subject populations by going to ^*war; even a losing state can do this. The state, qua state, rules rather than serves. In exercising a state’s rule, there are four distinguishable, broad, ^*initiated-imposition aspects that it is usually (invariably?) guilty of perpetrating: ^*parasitism, ^*persecution, ^*privilege and ^*Procrusteanism. In practice, of course, all these activities are described using ^*legitimising ^*propaganda. Without at least one of these there could not be a state; or it would exist in a dormant way, at most. Any other aspects of the state (such as services provided in order to buy ^*votes or to legitimise its existence) that are in principle ^*economic would exist anyway and more efficiently without state interference crowding them out.

Thus, the initial theory and subsequent analysis reveals a state to be a dominant ^*criminal organisation that is popularly misperceived as legitimate (or the state would cease to be ^*tolerated). Modern states usually include an executive, legislature, judiciary and courts, ^*local governments, a ^*bureaucracy, armed forces, state ^*police, state ^*schools, and various ^*“nationalised” industries, all of which also rule to varying degrees; although power flows down from the top of the ^*hierarchy. Only what remains is genuinely ^*voluntaristic ^*civil society. See also ^*Mafia; ^*sovereignty.

(This is an entry from A Libertarian Dictionary: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)