“something that everyone has a *legal *right to use but not to exclude others from using and, usually, not to destroy”
When taken literally, this leads to conflict when persons try to exercise their rights in incompatible ways. Hence, in practice there is always a precedent, agreement, or custom that determines who is excluded when incompatible uses come into conflict. In cases where such does not exist, a dispute is likely to establish it, when the conflict becomes palpable.
This counts as an argument against employment of common ownership. But this might be outweighed when dividing a resource among individual owners is inefficient or simply impossible.
Elinor Ostrom was notable for her studies of solutions to problems of resources that were inherently shared.
>>“something that everyone has a *legal *right to use but not to exclude others from using and, usually, not to destroy”
>When taken literally, this leads to conflict when persons try to exercise their rights in incompatible ways. Hence, in practice there is always a precedent, agreement, or custom that determines who is excluded when incompatible uses come into conflict. In cases where such does not exist, a dispute is likely to establish it, when the conflict becomes palpable.
Right.
>This counts as an argument against employment of common ownership. But this might be outweighed when dividing a resource among individual owners is inefficient or simply impossible.
Suggested examples would be useful.
>Elinor Ostrom was notable for her studies of solutions to problems of resources that were inherently shared.
Suggested examples might be useful. Were they really inherently shared or had their privatisation been limited by the state? Or was the shared solution “good enough” rather than necessary?
Examples: The hallways and stairways of a high-rise residence building, plus other infrastructure and maintenance. A small dwelling can have separate entrances and installations, but not a big building, not without becoming ridiculously costly. They could have a single owner, but use is inherently shared.
Ostrom studied sharing of fisheries, ecosystems, irrigation systems, and oil fields.
In your example, people all opt in to a known private system with rules in place (but usually changeable). So, it is a private economic solution rather than an inherently shared problem.
That objection quibbles about terminology rather than addressing the problem. Private economic solutions and inherent sharing are not mutually exclusive. Wouldn’t this require application of the aspect of the theory that allows exceptions to strict private property when strict enforcement is more of an initiated imposition than the alternative?
If a single owner is assumed, problems arise if no alternative is available: monopoly. If shared ownership is assumed, other problems arise. Just assuming a market solution or a state solution doesn’t actually solve the problems. If allowed to experiment, people will innovate, and various approaches are already known, though perhaps not well understood.
I was querying the alleged inherentness of, many of, the common-pool-resource problems.
>rather than addressing the problem.
What is “the problem”?
>Private economic solutions and inherent sharing are not mutually exclusive.
Right. But common-pool-resource problems are often cited as not having private-property solutions. And that is what I doubt.
>Wouldn’t this require
Wouldn’t what require?
>application of the aspect of the theory that allows exceptions to strict private property when strict enforcement is more of an initiated imposition than the alternative?
>If a single owner is assumed, problems arise if no alternative is available: monopoly. If shared ownership is assumed, other problems arise. Just assuming a market solution or a state solution doesn’t actually solve the problems. If allowed to experiment, people will innovate, and various approaches are already known, though perhaps not well understood.
I suspect I might agree with this. But without any concrete examples, it is hard to be entirely sure what all these abstractions are intended to mean.
This has always been a topic I felt I should be interested in, but am not actually that interested. I have one of Ostrom's books, and a book about her, but they didn’t grab me. I didn’t get very far into them, and have forgotten most of what I read.
From what I recall, Ostrom showed how common-pool-resource problems could be solved without state-regulation. However, I usually suspected that private-property solutions would have been better still but they were being obstructed by the state.
“something that everyone has a *legal *right to use but not to exclude others from using and, usually, not to destroy”
When taken literally, this leads to conflict when persons try to exercise their rights in incompatible ways. Hence, in practice there is always a precedent, agreement, or custom that determines who is excluded when incompatible uses come into conflict. In cases where such does not exist, a dispute is likely to establish it, when the conflict becomes palpable.
This counts as an argument against employment of common ownership. But this might be outweighed when dividing a resource among individual owners is inefficient or simply impossible.
Elinor Ostrom was notable for her studies of solutions to problems of resources that were inherently shared.
>>“something that everyone has a *legal *right to use but not to exclude others from using and, usually, not to destroy”
>When taken literally, this leads to conflict when persons try to exercise their rights in incompatible ways. Hence, in practice there is always a precedent, agreement, or custom that determines who is excluded when incompatible uses come into conflict. In cases where such does not exist, a dispute is likely to establish it, when the conflict becomes palpable.
Right.
>This counts as an argument against employment of common ownership. But this might be outweighed when dividing a resource among individual owners is inefficient or simply impossible.
Suggested examples would be useful.
>Elinor Ostrom was notable for her studies of solutions to problems of resources that were inherently shared.
Suggested examples might be useful. Were they really inherently shared or had their privatisation been limited by the state? Or was the shared solution “good enough” rather than necessary?
Examples: The hallways and stairways of a high-rise residence building, plus other infrastructure and maintenance. A small dwelling can have separate entrances and installations, but not a big building, not without becoming ridiculously costly. They could have a single owner, but use is inherently shared.
Ostrom studied sharing of fisheries, ecosystems, irrigation systems, and oil fields.
In your example, people all opt in to a known private system with rules in place (but usually changeable). So, it is a private economic solution rather than an inherently shared problem.
That objection quibbles about terminology rather than addressing the problem. Private economic solutions and inherent sharing are not mutually exclusive. Wouldn’t this require application of the aspect of the theory that allows exceptions to strict private property when strict enforcement is more of an initiated imposition than the alternative?
If a single owner is assumed, problems arise if no alternative is available: monopoly. If shared ownership is assumed, other problems arise. Just assuming a market solution or a state solution doesn’t actually solve the problems. If allowed to experiment, people will innovate, and various approaches are already known, though perhaps not well understood.
>That objection quibbles about terminology
I was querying the alleged inherentness of, many of, the common-pool-resource problems.
>rather than addressing the problem.
What is “the problem”?
>Private economic solutions and inherent sharing are not mutually exclusive.
Right. But common-pool-resource problems are often cited as not having private-property solutions. And that is what I doubt.
>Wouldn’t this require
Wouldn’t what require?
>application of the aspect of the theory that allows exceptions to strict private property when strict enforcement is more of an initiated imposition than the alternative?
>If a single owner is assumed, problems arise if no alternative is available: monopoly. If shared ownership is assumed, other problems arise. Just assuming a market solution or a state solution doesn’t actually solve the problems. If allowed to experiment, people will innovate, and various approaches are already known, though perhaps not well understood.
I suspect I might agree with this. But without any concrete examples, it is hard to be entirely sure what all these abstractions are intended to mean.
This has always been a topic I felt I should be interested in, but am not actually that interested. I have one of Ostrom's books, and a book about her, but they didn’t grab me. I didn’t get very far into them, and have forgotten most of what I read.
From what I recall, Ostrom showed how common-pool-resource problems could be solved without state-regulation. However, I usually suspected that private-property solutions would have been better still but they were being obstructed by the state.