But I think you mentioned to me once, we can never entirely do without them. The winner in a tort action has a motive to exaggerate the value of the claim. The arbitrator must try to make the settlement reasonable, which means at least some degree of guessing what the subjective aspect of the tort was worth to the person who suffered it (and even more difficult when setting a punishment for a crime).
In some instances people might choose badly when deciding what rules they should all agree to. This argues for competition and pluralism among such solutions, so that errors can be discovered and corrected. But an equally strong impetus pushes the other way, in that a uniform law over a large area has advantages for efficiency and convenience. Perhaps a hybrid could be imagined, with a stable shared core of basic rules, with local idiosyncratic additions on the margin. If this idea was pushed as far as it could go, we might end up with a kind of libertarian contractarianism, where nearly every rule was possible, given that all those subject to it in some serious sense had consented to it, and could exit or secede without much trouble. The “Utopia” thought experiment of Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia hints at this.
>But I think you mentioned to me once, we can never entirely do without them.
Or so I once thought. Now I am not sure.
>The winner in a tort action has a motive to exaggerate the value of the claim. The arbitrator must try to make the settlement reasonable, which means at least some degree of guessing what the subjective aspect of the tort was worth to the person who suffered it (and even more difficult when setting a punishment for a crime).
But that is not really an IUC: we are not trying to compare his (dis)utility to someone else’s. In any case, the way it is done might be contractual and so not in any way at odds with libertarianism.
The rest of your comment is very well thought out and I find it difficult, off hand, to fault it. The only thing that springs to mind is that people might have contracted such that they could not “exit or secede”. I do apologise for my lack of acumen.
Yes, if a settlement is based on the contract terms, there is no problem. The problem arises when no explicit agreement already covers the interaction that occurred without the consent of the owner. The arbitrator is in effect required to calculate the “just price” at which the transaction could have occurred voluntarily, which is not strictly possible. But a compromise must be made, as one party cannot simply declare the price unilaterally. And some “transactions” would never take place voluntarily, at whatever price. So perhaps this is the wrong way of thinking about restitution. (Or some pseudocontract must cover all these unforeseen cases?)
Your modest response to my last paragraph makes me wonder if I failed to make my idea understandable. Some aspects of society are determined (entailed) by the choice to respect liberty or not. The theory of liberty calls for minimizing specific impositions. But which impositions are considered more onerous might depend on subjective evaluations and fallible understandings of social science. If the legal/institutional structure must not merely adopt a static ranking of impositions, but rather allow for experimentation and learning about the social ranking of impositions, we need something like a market that allows an intersubjective social ranking to emerge from the process of persons choosing their own ranking.
This perhaps does not contradict liberty, but rather emphasizes an aspect of it. Each person can’t have their own unique legal structure, but persons with similar preferences should be able to find and associate with each other, and refuse to associate with others in some ways. Logically, nothing would prevent that process from converging upon an answer, a ranking of impositions that everyone in some sense had agreed to and that accorded with facts about social organization. In practice, that seems unlikely, unless the incentives for accepting a compromise structure are much stronger than those for exploring the unknown. But at least the subjects of the various experiments participate voluntarily. If so, being genuinely able to exit or secede would be a stronger marker of liberty than the presence or absence of any other particular imposition. (It doesn’t matter how horrible a circumstance I am in, if by snapping my fingers I can escape. So if I don’t snap my fingers, I must consider tolerating the horribleness more valuable than escaping.)
How do we know which impositions are completely ruled out by the theory of liberty, and which remain as candidates for experimentation and comparative study? What minimizes impositions with regard to exit or secession? Rules about exit could be abused in either direction: North Korea could declare that departing migrants owe them a ridiculous amount for their education, etc. But if this is prohibited, an ordinary debtor might seek to avoid his debts by emigration. Etc.
I’m not sure where it leads. I will stop here to see if you think this makes sense.
>Yes, if a settlement is based on the contract terms, there is no problem. The problem arises when no explicit agreement already covers the interaction that occurred without the consent of the owner.
If neither party is already signed up to any arbitration agency, then they will probably need to do so in order to proceed. And that will contract them into accepting the outcome.
>… The theory of liberty calls for minimizing specific impositions.
Minimising initiated impositions.
>… we need something like a market that allows an intersubjective social ranking to emerge from the process of persons choosing their own ranking.
That’s all fine as long as people contract into it, which they probably will do as the practical option.
>… But at least the subjects of the various experiments participate voluntarily. If so, being genuinely able to exit or secede would be a stronger marker of liberty than the presence or absence of any other particular imposition.
It would be a weaker marker of liberty if people cannot make binding contracts from which they cannot exit or secede.
>How do we know which impositions are completely ruled out by the theory of liberty, and which remain as candidates for experimentation and comparative study?
We don’t. We have to deal with concrete cases as they arise.
>What minimizes impositions with regard to exit or secession?
That any contract is adhered to.
>Rules about exit could be abused in either direction: North Korea could declare that departing migrants owe them a ridiculous amount for their education, etc.
People did not freely contract into that totalitarian regime (or any regime).
>But if this is prohibited, an ordinary debtor might seek to avoid his debts by emigration. Etc.
It is probably a lesser initiated imposition for any North Korean subject to escape if he gets the chance. He can pay any libertarian debts by transferring the money (if the state allows it).
[If neither party is already signed up to any arbitration agency, then they will probably need to do so in order to proceed. ]
Signing up in advance makes some sense, but is not absolutely required. A society without specialist arbitration agencies with membership could still have liberty. An unsigned person in a society where resigning is predominant does not violate the liberty of others. Arbitration agencies are an innovation we expect to succeed, not a part of the basic idea.
>… we need something like a market that allows an intersubjective social ranking to emerge from the process of persons choosing their own ranking.
[That’s all fine as long as people contract into it, ]
That requires that contract be more fundamental than any of the rules they agree on or are able to modify later. Good point. Does that mean there can be no variation among the various localities in interpreting contracts? Or if a locality adopts a dissident interpretation of how contracts apply, that they can be sued by those who don’t go along? If they do not impose the standard interpretation on themselves, there is no one to impose it on them. So we should say, well, they can do that, but they have violated the theory of liberty?
[It would be a weaker marker of liberty if people cannot make binding contracts from which they cannot exit or secede.]
What if they unanimously chose to adopt the policy not to honor such contracts? If someone decided they needed such a contract later, they could always exit or secede, and then proceed with their contracting. What is imposed on whom?
>How do we know which impositions are completely ruled out by the theory of liberty, and which remain as candidates for experimentation and comparative study?
[We don’t. We have to deal with concrete cases as they arise.]
Everything is open to doubt or modification, then?
>What minimizes impositions with regard to exit or secession?
[That any contract is adhered to.]
A fundamental imposition is breaking a contract.
>Rules about exit could be abused in either direction: North Korea could declare that departing migrants owe them a ridiculous amount for their education, etc.
[People did not freely contract into that totalitarian regime (or any regime).]
I was using it for illustration, not seriously evaluating it as potentially free.
Some cases seem clear. But there is also a gray zone, where it isn’t clear whether consent is valid or not. Perhaps this is another area for concrete case by case evaluation.
>But if this is prohibited, an ordinary debtor might seek to avoid his debts by emigration. Etc.
[It is probably a lesser initiated imposition for any North Korean subject to escape]
I agree. I was thinking of a valid debt. Say I borrow some money from you, but then migrate to a region where a different institutional structure is in effect, preventing you from suing me when my debts comes due and I fail to pay. Obviously, just changing my location or repudiating the legal system doesn’t invalidate the debt, if it was consented to freely. But if what counts as legitimate consent depends on institutions, or custom, or contracts that can be modified, etc., things get complicated. Do I have liberty if I can never decide my current situation was a mistake and I should exit or secede? Perhaps my liberty is violated if I am prohibited from making such contracts, but isn’t my liberty also violated by having to stick to them? In effect, I have the liberty to destroy my liberty, but I shouldn’t say I still have it if it is gone.
[If neither party is already signed up to any arbitration agency, then they will probably need to do so in order to proceed.]
>Signing up in advance makes some sense, but is not absolutely required. A society without specialist arbitration agencies with membership could still have liberty. An unsigned person in a society where resigning is predominant does not violate the liberty of others. Arbitration agencies are an innovation we expect to succeed, not a part of the basic idea.
The basic idea is the theory of liberty-in-itself. Then we can try to work out what is possible and what is likely.
>… we need something like a market that allows an intersubjective social ranking to emerge from the process of persons choosing their own ranking.
[That’s all fine as long as people contract into it,]
>That requires that contract be more fundamental than any of the rules they agree on or are able to modify later. Good point. Does that mean there can be no variation among the various localities in interpreting contracts?
I guess there would be variation.
>Or if a locality adopts a dissident interpretation of how contracts apply, that they can be sued by those who don’t go along? If they do not impose the standard interpretation on themselves, there is no one to impose it on them. So we should say, well, they can do that, but they have violated the theory of liberty?
As usual, you want to discuss too many abstract hypotheticals all at once. This is less focused and relevant than I can usefully respond to.
[It would be a weaker marker of liberty if people cannot make binding contracts from which they cannot exit or secede.]
>What if they unanimously chose to adopt the policy not to honor such contracts? If someone decided they needed such a contract later, they could always exit or secede, and then proceed with their contracting. What is imposed on whom?
Too many abstract hypotheticals.
>How do we know which impositions are completely ruled out by the theory of liberty, and which remain as candidates for experimentation and comparative study?
[We don’t. We have to deal with concrete cases as they arise.]
>Everything is open to doubt or modification, then?
That is critical rationalism.
>What minimizes impositions with regard to exit or secession?
[That any contract is adhered to.]
>A fundamental imposition is breaking a contract.
It depends on the contract. It might be trivial and so breaking it would not seem to be “fundamental”.
>Some cases seem clear. But there is also a gray zone, where it isn’t clear whether consent is valid or not. Perhaps this is another area for concrete case by case evaluation.
Yes. You seem prone to hanker after an impossible a priori theory that covers every abstract logical possibility.
>But if this is prohibited, an ordinary debtor might seek to avoid his debts by emigration. Etc.
[It is probably a lesser initiated imposition for any North Korean subject to escape]
>I agree. I was thinking of a valid debt. Say I borrow some money from you, but then migrate to a region where a different institutional structure is in effect, preventing you from suing me when my debts comes due and I fail to pay.
Then you have infringed my liberty.
>Obviously, just changing my location or repudiating the legal system doesn’t invalidate the debt, if it was consented to freely. But if what counts as legitimate consent depends on institutions, or custom, or contracts that can be modified, etc., things get complicated.
Hypothetical abstract complications (which are logically infinite) are not really germane to criticising the theory of liberty or its practicality.
>Do I have liberty if I can never decide my current situation was a mistake and I should exit or secede? Perhaps my liberty is violated if I am prohibited from making such contracts, but isn’t my liberty also violated by having to stick to them? In effect, I have the liberty to destroy my liberty, but I shouldn’t say I still have it if it is gone.
There is no focus when you ask so many abstract questions at once, especially when it is not even clear what each question really means. Philosophy is best done by separating and clarifying problems so that they can be addressed carefully and precisely one part at a time.
What theory of liberty? I would not say that my theory is "multidimensional". But you can have more liberty or less, and more in some ways but less in others. It is still the same liberty: not having initiated impositions.
The theory seems stronger without IUCs. Bravo!
But I think you mentioned to me once, we can never entirely do without them. The winner in a tort action has a motive to exaggerate the value of the claim. The arbitrator must try to make the settlement reasonable, which means at least some degree of guessing what the subjective aspect of the tort was worth to the person who suffered it (and even more difficult when setting a punishment for a crime).
In some instances people might choose badly when deciding what rules they should all agree to. This argues for competition and pluralism among such solutions, so that errors can be discovered and corrected. But an equally strong impetus pushes the other way, in that a uniform law over a large area has advantages for efficiency and convenience. Perhaps a hybrid could be imagined, with a stable shared core of basic rules, with local idiosyncratic additions on the margin. If this idea was pushed as far as it could go, we might end up with a kind of libertarian contractarianism, where nearly every rule was possible, given that all those subject to it in some serious sense had consented to it, and could exit or secede without much trouble. The “Utopia” thought experiment of Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia hints at this.
>The theory seems stronger without IUCs. Bravo!
Thank you.
>But I think you mentioned to me once, we can never entirely do without them.
Or so I once thought. Now I am not sure.
>The winner in a tort action has a motive to exaggerate the value of the claim. The arbitrator must try to make the settlement reasonable, which means at least some degree of guessing what the subjective aspect of the tort was worth to the person who suffered it (and even more difficult when setting a punishment for a crime).
But that is not really an IUC: we are not trying to compare his (dis)utility to someone else’s. In any case, the way it is done might be contractual and so not in any way at odds with libertarianism.
The rest of your comment is very well thought out and I find it difficult, off hand, to fault it. The only thing that springs to mind is that people might have contracted such that they could not “exit or secede”. I do apologise for my lack of acumen.
Yes, if a settlement is based on the contract terms, there is no problem. The problem arises when no explicit agreement already covers the interaction that occurred without the consent of the owner. The arbitrator is in effect required to calculate the “just price” at which the transaction could have occurred voluntarily, which is not strictly possible. But a compromise must be made, as one party cannot simply declare the price unilaterally. And some “transactions” would never take place voluntarily, at whatever price. So perhaps this is the wrong way of thinking about restitution. (Or some pseudocontract must cover all these unforeseen cases?)
Your modest response to my last paragraph makes me wonder if I failed to make my idea understandable. Some aspects of society are determined (entailed) by the choice to respect liberty or not. The theory of liberty calls for minimizing specific impositions. But which impositions are considered more onerous might depend on subjective evaluations and fallible understandings of social science. If the legal/institutional structure must not merely adopt a static ranking of impositions, but rather allow for experimentation and learning about the social ranking of impositions, we need something like a market that allows an intersubjective social ranking to emerge from the process of persons choosing their own ranking.
This perhaps does not contradict liberty, but rather emphasizes an aspect of it. Each person can’t have their own unique legal structure, but persons with similar preferences should be able to find and associate with each other, and refuse to associate with others in some ways. Logically, nothing would prevent that process from converging upon an answer, a ranking of impositions that everyone in some sense had agreed to and that accorded with facts about social organization. In practice, that seems unlikely, unless the incentives for accepting a compromise structure are much stronger than those for exploring the unknown. But at least the subjects of the various experiments participate voluntarily. If so, being genuinely able to exit or secede would be a stronger marker of liberty than the presence or absence of any other particular imposition. (It doesn’t matter how horrible a circumstance I am in, if by snapping my fingers I can escape. So if I don’t snap my fingers, I must consider tolerating the horribleness more valuable than escaping.)
How do we know which impositions are completely ruled out by the theory of liberty, and which remain as candidates for experimentation and comparative study? What minimizes impositions with regard to exit or secession? Rules about exit could be abused in either direction: North Korea could declare that departing migrants owe them a ridiculous amount for their education, etc. But if this is prohibited, an ordinary debtor might seek to avoid his debts by emigration. Etc.
I’m not sure where it leads. I will stop here to see if you think this makes sense.
>Yes, if a settlement is based on the contract terms, there is no problem. The problem arises when no explicit agreement already covers the interaction that occurred without the consent of the owner.
If neither party is already signed up to any arbitration agency, then they will probably need to do so in order to proceed. And that will contract them into accepting the outcome.
>… The theory of liberty calls for minimizing specific impositions.
Minimising initiated impositions.
>… we need something like a market that allows an intersubjective social ranking to emerge from the process of persons choosing their own ranking.
That’s all fine as long as people contract into it, which they probably will do as the practical option.
>… But at least the subjects of the various experiments participate voluntarily. If so, being genuinely able to exit or secede would be a stronger marker of liberty than the presence or absence of any other particular imposition.
It would be a weaker marker of liberty if people cannot make binding contracts from which they cannot exit or secede.
>How do we know which impositions are completely ruled out by the theory of liberty, and which remain as candidates for experimentation and comparative study?
We don’t. We have to deal with concrete cases as they arise.
>What minimizes impositions with regard to exit or secession?
That any contract is adhered to.
>Rules about exit could be abused in either direction: North Korea could declare that departing migrants owe them a ridiculous amount for their education, etc.
People did not freely contract into that totalitarian regime (or any regime).
>But if this is prohibited, an ordinary debtor might seek to avoid his debts by emigration. Etc.
It is probably a lesser initiated imposition for any North Korean subject to escape if he gets the chance. He can pay any libertarian debts by transferring the money (if the state allows it).
[If neither party is already signed up to any arbitration agency, then they will probably need to do so in order to proceed. ]
Signing up in advance makes some sense, but is not absolutely required. A society without specialist arbitration agencies with membership could still have liberty. An unsigned person in a society where resigning is predominant does not violate the liberty of others. Arbitration agencies are an innovation we expect to succeed, not a part of the basic idea.
>… we need something like a market that allows an intersubjective social ranking to emerge from the process of persons choosing their own ranking.
[That’s all fine as long as people contract into it, ]
That requires that contract be more fundamental than any of the rules they agree on or are able to modify later. Good point. Does that mean there can be no variation among the various localities in interpreting contracts? Or if a locality adopts a dissident interpretation of how contracts apply, that they can be sued by those who don’t go along? If they do not impose the standard interpretation on themselves, there is no one to impose it on them. So we should say, well, they can do that, but they have violated the theory of liberty?
[It would be a weaker marker of liberty if people cannot make binding contracts from which they cannot exit or secede.]
What if they unanimously chose to adopt the policy not to honor such contracts? If someone decided they needed such a contract later, they could always exit or secede, and then proceed with their contracting. What is imposed on whom?
>How do we know which impositions are completely ruled out by the theory of liberty, and which remain as candidates for experimentation and comparative study?
[We don’t. We have to deal with concrete cases as they arise.]
Everything is open to doubt or modification, then?
>What minimizes impositions with regard to exit or secession?
[That any contract is adhered to.]
A fundamental imposition is breaking a contract.
>Rules about exit could be abused in either direction: North Korea could declare that departing migrants owe them a ridiculous amount for their education, etc.
[People did not freely contract into that totalitarian regime (or any regime).]
I was using it for illustration, not seriously evaluating it as potentially free.
Some cases seem clear. But there is also a gray zone, where it isn’t clear whether consent is valid or not. Perhaps this is another area for concrete case by case evaluation.
>But if this is prohibited, an ordinary debtor might seek to avoid his debts by emigration. Etc.
[It is probably a lesser initiated imposition for any North Korean subject to escape]
I agree. I was thinking of a valid debt. Say I borrow some money from you, but then migrate to a region where a different institutional structure is in effect, preventing you from suing me when my debts comes due and I fail to pay. Obviously, just changing my location or repudiating the legal system doesn’t invalidate the debt, if it was consented to freely. But if what counts as legitimate consent depends on institutions, or custom, or contracts that can be modified, etc., things get complicated. Do I have liberty if I can never decide my current situation was a mistake and I should exit or secede? Perhaps my liberty is violated if I am prohibited from making such contracts, but isn’t my liberty also violated by having to stick to them? In effect, I have the liberty to destroy my liberty, but I shouldn’t say I still have it if it is gone.
[If neither party is already signed up to any arbitration agency, then they will probably need to do so in order to proceed.]
>Signing up in advance makes some sense, but is not absolutely required. A society without specialist arbitration agencies with membership could still have liberty. An unsigned person in a society where resigning is predominant does not violate the liberty of others. Arbitration agencies are an innovation we expect to succeed, not a part of the basic idea.
The basic idea is the theory of liberty-in-itself. Then we can try to work out what is possible and what is likely.
>… we need something like a market that allows an intersubjective social ranking to emerge from the process of persons choosing their own ranking.
[That’s all fine as long as people contract into it,]
>That requires that contract be more fundamental than any of the rules they agree on or are able to modify later. Good point. Does that mean there can be no variation among the various localities in interpreting contracts?
I guess there would be variation.
>Or if a locality adopts a dissident interpretation of how contracts apply, that they can be sued by those who don’t go along? If they do not impose the standard interpretation on themselves, there is no one to impose it on them. So we should say, well, they can do that, but they have violated the theory of liberty?
As usual, you want to discuss too many abstract hypotheticals all at once. This is less focused and relevant than I can usefully respond to.
[It would be a weaker marker of liberty if people cannot make binding contracts from which they cannot exit or secede.]
>What if they unanimously chose to adopt the policy not to honor such contracts? If someone decided they needed such a contract later, they could always exit or secede, and then proceed with their contracting. What is imposed on whom?
Too many abstract hypotheticals.
>How do we know which impositions are completely ruled out by the theory of liberty, and which remain as candidates for experimentation and comparative study?
[We don’t. We have to deal with concrete cases as they arise.]
>Everything is open to doubt or modification, then?
That is critical rationalism.
>What minimizes impositions with regard to exit or secession?
[That any contract is adhered to.]
>A fundamental imposition is breaking a contract.
It depends on the contract. It might be trivial and so breaking it would not seem to be “fundamental”.
>Some cases seem clear. But there is also a gray zone, where it isn’t clear whether consent is valid or not. Perhaps this is another area for concrete case by case evaluation.
Yes. You seem prone to hanker after an impossible a priori theory that covers every abstract logical possibility.
>But if this is prohibited, an ordinary debtor might seek to avoid his debts by emigration. Etc.
[It is probably a lesser initiated imposition for any North Korean subject to escape]
>I agree. I was thinking of a valid debt. Say I borrow some money from you, but then migrate to a region where a different institutional structure is in effect, preventing you from suing me when my debts comes due and I fail to pay.
Then you have infringed my liberty.
>Obviously, just changing my location or repudiating the legal system doesn’t invalidate the debt, if it was consented to freely. But if what counts as legitimate consent depends on institutions, or custom, or contracts that can be modified, etc., things get complicated.
Hypothetical abstract complications (which are logically infinite) are not really germane to criticising the theory of liberty or its practicality.
>Do I have liberty if I can never decide my current situation was a mistake and I should exit or secede? Perhaps my liberty is violated if I am prohibited from making such contracts, but isn’t my liberty also violated by having to stick to them? In effect, I have the liberty to destroy my liberty, but I shouldn’t say I still have it if it is gone.
There is no focus when you ask so many abstract questions at once, especially when it is not even clear what each question really means. Philosophy is best done by separating and clarifying problems so that they can be addressed carefully and precisely one part at a time.
Maybe I should not treat liberty as a binary, you have it or you don’t. Perhaps it should be thought of as multidimensional.
What theory of liberty? I would not say that my theory is "multidimensional". But you can have more liberty or less, and more in some ways but less in others. It is still the same liberty: not having initiated impositions.