Utopianism: a Libertarian Viewpoint
"A society with no state ... merely has a great evil removed"
utopianism Thomas Moore (1478–1535) wrote Utopia (1516) to depict an ideal society (the title appears to pun on “eutopia” and “iutopia”: “good place” and “no place”). Since then, the advocacy or pursuit of such societies has been known as “utopian” or “utopianism”. This is usually intended to imply that such societies are hopelessly unrealistic, as will be assumed here (for the sake of argument). The issue, then, is to consider one view, “anarcho-libertarianism is impossibly utopian”. This will be done by replying to a few typical examples of why this is sometimes thought to be true.
1) “Such a society is impossibly perfectionist”. A society with no *state—i.e., fully *privatised—merely has a great evil removed (akin to all types of cancer being completely cured, only much more important) rather than being a comprehensive ideal. It is up to individuals what kinds of lives they will then choose to live, as long as they do not, unnecessarily, *initiate impositions on other people. There will still be innumerable things that are wrong with the world: personal, social, and otherwise.
2) “Libertarianism assumes an unrealistic view of human nature”. This is an odd criticism, but one that is often made. It is odd because no libertarians assert that human nature is, can be, or need be made, different from what most people assume it to be: in particular, largely self-interested and very fallible. So, this criticism presupposes that the institutions of *anarcho-*libertarianism would require better people than currently exist. But then that seems to amount to an indirect criticism of the practicality of those institutions without explaining wherein their precise failings are supposed to lie.
3) “Human liberties inherently clash and it requires political compromise to solve this”. This appears to assume something like the zero-sum conception of *liberty as understood by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). But the main libertarian approach to liberty (here theorised as minimising initiated impositions) is not zero-sum but overwhelmingly compossible. And “political compromise” is a euphemism: it sounds like peaceful negotiation, but it is more likely to be a biased ruling compelled by threats of *aggressive violence.
4) “Anarchy cannot function because people need laws and their enforcement”. This is simply confusing—as most people do—“anarchy” (no political rule) with “anomy” (no *law). Anarcho-libertarians do not think that laws are unnecessary or need not be enforced.
5) “There has never been large-scale, non-state law”. This is refuted by the historical societies of ancient Iceland and Ireland: both of which were very long-lasting.
6) “There has never been a society with full *private-property anarchy and libertarian law”. Just because something hasn’t happened before, doesn’t entail that it’s impossible. Every type of thing that now exists once used to not exist.
7) “Anarcho-libertarianism is impossible for economic or technical reasons”. Then it is necessary to explain at least one example of this. Many alleged such examples are discussed in this dictionary, although no discussions are ever intended to settle the matter beyond further dispute.
There are several things that serious proponents of the view that “anarcho-libertarianism is impossibly utopian” should do. 1) Avoid equivocating or rotating among various possible criticisms. 2) Consider the possibility that what they regard as *certain, *common sense, and self-evident might not be an intellectually *autonomous opinion. Rather, it is simply something they have adopted without any critical consideration of the vast libertarian literature that explains and defends it in terms of philosophy, politics, economics, history, law, etc. 3) Informed by the literature, they should attempt to produce at least one alleged refuting example and then offer it for critical examination by libertarian advocates understanding the relevant subject areas.
Two further points are also worth noting. Many social changes, desirable and otherwise, that people tend to take for granted today were once dismissed as being impossibly “utopian”. And even if some goal is “utopian” in the sense that it is clearly not fully achievable—such as the elimination of all murder—that doesn’t entail that it is undesirable to aim for it as far as is practical (i.e., *economic).
(This is an entry from A Libertarian Dictionary: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)
>3) “Human liberties inherently clash and it requires political compromise to solve this”. This appears to assume something like the zero-sum conception of *liberty as understood by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). But the main libertarian approach to liberty (here theorised as minimising initiated impositions) is not zero-sum but overwhelmingly compossible.
I agree, but it's worse than that. The claim refuted is ambiguous, an example of the dangers of loose language. “Political compromise “ is a euphemism, which tempts the audience to think of peaceful negotiation, when actually what is referred to is compulsion backed with violent threats.
>4) “Anarchy cannot function because people need laws and their enforcement”. This is simply confusing—as most people do—“anarchy” (no political rule) with “anomy” (no *law). Anarcho-libertarians do not think that laws are unnecessary or need not be enforced.
Do they think that the Jews had no law before King Saul?
>5) “There has never been large-scale, non-state law”. This is refuted by the historical societies of ancient Iceland and Ireland: both of which were very long-lasting.
And Law Merchant.
>. Many social changes, desirable and otherwise, that people tend to take for granted today were once dismissed as being impossibly “utopian”. And even if some goal is “utopian” in the sense that it is clearly not fully achievable—such as the elimination of all murder—that doesn’t entail that it is undesirable to aim for it as far as is practical (i.e., *economic).
There is also a sort of reverse “no true Scotsman” fallacy being employed, where the critic assumes that “true laissez faire” was put into practice some time in the past but obviously failed.