Social Atomism and Libertarianism

atomism, social  One popular criticism of ^*libertarianism arises from the apparent implication, to some people, that human beings can exist outside ^*society. We are told that they cannot do so and, more to the point, living within a society brings ^*collective ^*rights and ^*duties that are incompatible with libertarianism. Connected with this point is that libertarians are held to believe in a socially disconnected “rugged individualism” that is quite impractical for many people as well as being heartlessly destructive of general ^*welfare. These, and similar points along the same lines, are sometimes pejoratively labelled the “(social) atomism” of libertarianism. Such criticisms are invariably some combination of misunderstandings and fallacies.

Of course, libertarians do not deny that we need other people (parents or guardians) to raise us to a state of individual ^*sovereignty. We could then, at least, live a hermitic existence if we so choose. But most people, including libertarians, would find such a life to be hugely impoverished.

As for collective rights and duties, nothing is given to us by, or by us to, an agent or organisation that is society. Everything is given by particular people (or ^*organisations of people, which society is not) to particular people, including life itself from our parents. Despite the inestimable value of what we all receive by social participation, it is arbitrary to suggest that people can be entitled to an enforceable ^*right to any kind of positive benefit from anyone else without a ^*contractual agreement (and such a “right” would, and does, lessen ^*liberty and welfare).

However, libertarianism is only about liberty; it does not require personal independence or autarky. With libertarianism people can be as “collectivistic” as they like—taking out insurance or even practicing, small-scale, ^*communism—as long as what they do does not ^*initiate impositions on the ^*person or ^*property of anyone else. Moreover, most libertarians heartily approve of ^*charity, which is inherently libertarian as well as being far more efficient than ^*tax-^*extorted transfers.

The market is not harsh, as some people assume. They feel that the market means that “the weak must go to the wall”. But only weak goods and services “must go to the wall” in a libertarian society. (Strictly, this commonly misunderstood expression refers not to weak people being ruthlessly neglected but, quite the reverse, their being offered the relief of leaning in church instead of having to stand unaided.)

What of an individual’s duties to his ^*family, ^*community, and ^*state? Apart from what might be in the ^*marriage contract (or any subsequent, possibly implicit, contracts among family members), there are no enforceable duties to benefit one’s family: it does not own what one produces. Family relations are mainly based on, and sustained by, natural affection. If this fails, then we each have a right to exit; although any ^*children need to be found proper care first. To the extent that we live in any kind of literal community, it is ipso facto voluntary. The state, by contrast, is a ^*criminal organisation that we have a positive duty to avoid supporting; to the extent that we can do so safely, at least. We do, of course, always have a libertarian duty to avoid initiating impositions on other people.

Only from a perspective that sanctions ^*aggressively-imposed collective ownership might libertarianism appear to be “atomistic”.

See ^*communitarianism; ^*individualism; ^*jury service.

(This is an entry from A LIBERTARIAN DICTIONARY: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)