Prejudice: a Libertarian Viewpoint

"making an initial judgment after considering scant argument or evidence is ineluctable when it does happen"

prejudice  To have a prejudice in the sense intended here (which omits the legal senses) is, by usage and etymology, to have pre-judged something and usually unfavourably. That is, to have formed a belief prior to due (or even full) consideration of the relevant arguments or adequate evidence (or even all of it). This is often used to refer to generalisations, including stereotypes, that ignore the differences of specific examples. And it is usually suggested as a criticism, whether explicitly or implicitly, that this is not rational (or “irrational”), or not moral, or not impartial. The word is typically used as a pejorative allegation (it might be emotively conjugated thus: I have worldly-wise intuitions; you are clearly prejudiced; he is utterly bigoted). An entire academic industry has grown up around the best ways to tackle the alleged “problem” of prejudice and any “unjust” resulting “discrimination”. Many dictionaries—including Wikipedia (Wokeipedia, more like)—and ChatGPT report, and even affirm the correctness of, this view. But that is irrelevant. Philosophy, like science, cannot be done or evaluated by using popular or common-sense usage: that is anti-philosophy. There are various severe philosophical problems with this account of prejudice.

1) As belief-formation is always automatic, rather than a choice, making an initial judgment after considering scant argument or evidence is ineluctable when it does happen (although such a belief might simply not occur to us, or we might not express it). Roger Scruton (1944-2020) begins his dictionary entry on “prejudice” thus: “Belief without reasoned support…” (Dictionary of Politics, 1982/2007). But given the truth of critical rationalism, there is no such thing as “reasoned support”.

2) How much consideration, or reasoning, is “due” ought to be an individual’s choice according to how much determining the truth of the belief is important to him (although other people might venture advice, at his invitation or at least with his permission). It is certainly not possible literally to give “full” consideration even if we want to: all theories have infinite implications and infinite criticisms of them are also possible.

3) What are “the relevant arguments” that we, by apparent implication, ought to consider? The ones that are popular, or all known to exist, or even those that are potential but not yet formulated (which are, of course, infinite)? Who should decide but each individual person for himself?

4) How much evidence is “adequate”? Again, should this not be the individual’s decision? But, in any case, it is impossible to collect and consider all of it: there is no finite end to potential data and tests. People will often choose to remain in what economists (and even some philosophers) call “rational ignorance”: i.e., they are really choosing what they judge to be an optimal level of research given the costs and benefits as they subjectively perceive them to be at the time.

5) It is impossible to avoid generalisations. Every thought and word implies a generalisation. Stereotypes are very broad generalisations, but they usually have some basis in truth: that is why they came to be and why they persist. And to go down to however particular a level is not to avoid generalisation. To say anything about even a particular person is to generalise: to suppose that general features about him are, and will probably remain, true (when we can only have the slightest knowledge of a person by real acquaintance, and that could be a mistaken impression).

6) As all one’s beliefs are part of one’s rational, or thinking, process (and not necessarily expressed in words), it cannot be correct that any belief is “not rational” or “irrational”. However, some belief might not be true, prudent, wise, logical, well-considered, etc.; some of which are tacitly what is always really meant.

7) As one’s beliefs are never chosen, they cannot be immoral. For if you ought to do something then that seems to imply that you can do it. A “thoughtcrime” over which we have no control hardly makes sense.

8) Pure impartiality makes no sense: it is a formal concept (like tolerance). Impartiality can only make sense in the application of some rule and within some group towards which we are partial. And all rules are inherently partial to some type of activity or outcome (even as general as “utility”) and some type of group (even to include all humans is thereby to exclude non-humans).

9) As we have now seen, it is always confused to use “prejudice” as a pejorative. But it would be relevant to assert the precise way that some particular belief is alleged to be mistaken and then offer an actual argument or evidence to that effect.

10) The problem is not that prejudice and any resulting discrimination are unjust. The problem is that people mistakenly think that they are. We cannot avoid judging, when we do so, on the basis of the apparent evidence and arguments so far. And to use these judgements to discriminate in the use of one’s person and property is simply to exercise one’s practical interpersonal liberty. The cause of the confusion is largely due to the aforementioned academic industry that makes these woke claims. And that industry exists in large part because of state (government) interference in academia.

Therefore, it is quite possible to be prejudiced (to have “rushed to judgement”) in some mistaken way. But we need a proper explanation of the alleged mistake if that is the case and if we are to correct it. A lot that is alleged to be mistaken prejudice is not mistaken at all. It is an adequately considered and true view that is merely at odds with the observer’s different view (which may itself be mistakenly prejudiced, as all woke views are). Or it is a matter of personal preference or taste wherein any further consideration would usually be irrelevant. Thus, in the sense intended here, the word is possibly best avoided except perhaps in retaliation against ignorant woke prejudice.

(This is an entry from A Libertarian Dictionary: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised].)