Harm Principle: a Libertarian Viewpoint

"a better criterion requires use of the proper philosophical theory of the liberty that libertarianism implies."

harm principle  A “harm principle” is most famously associated with J. S. Mill (1806–1873). Mill did not use that expression himself and he does not have a monopoly on the general idea (so “the harm principle” is somewhat misleading). Many people embrace some interpretation of such a principle. A ^*woke interpretation, for instance, would see the expression of certain opinions as harms to other people. The ^*non-aggression principle is a sort of ^*libertarian interpretation. Here we focus on a libertarian analysis.

Mill expressed his version in the essay On Liberty (1859) thus: “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (but some earlier historical examples express something like the same idea). This is intended to be anti-^*paternalism, pro-^*liberal-^*tolerance, and anti-harm-to-others. In Mill’s case it appears to refer only to harms to the bodies and minds of the other people. But whether taken in that narrow sense or a wider sense that includes harms to people’s ^*property generally, it is far from clear exactly what this is supposed to mean; as has often been observed.

Most obviously, we can be a cause of objective physical harm to others with their ^*consent. For instance, if we provide them with unhealthy food, recreational ^*drugs, participatory ^*sports, etc. Harming others with their agreement is part of ^*liberty. So, harm alone does not appear to be sufficient to count as being what is coercively disallowable on a libertarian basis. But suppose that a harm is inflicted on some innocent person against his will. That would appear to be unproblematically ruled out. Does this then mean that inflicted harm is at least a necessary part of what is disallowable? It appears that someone could interfere with the liberty of other people without using coercion and without physically harming them or their property: e.g., by putting biologically-needed medicine into their food when they don’t want to take it, or simply trespassing on their property while they are absent. Therefore, even the inflicted physical harm of other people is neither necessary nor sufficient as a comprehensive criterion of a coercible libertarian limit to individual behaviour. Is there, though, some correct intuition that a “harm principle” is imperfectly expressing? It seems that there is.

What is coercively disallowable is what ^*initiates impositions on other people (or normal adults, at least) by unnecessarily overriding their ^*consent as regards their bodies or their libertarian property. Note that, also unlike Mill’s version, this is a non-moralised interpretation (it is to assert what is objectively libertarian, not to morally affirm it; although one can do that too). In other words, a better criterion requires use of the proper ^*philosophical theory of the liberty that libertarianism implies. And this general problem with a “harm principle” is to be found repeatedly when there are attempts to solve libertarian problems without the explicit theory of liberty (hence this dictionary attempts a relatively comprehensive approach). The so-called “harm principle” must, for libertarians, really only be another way of saying that libertarian liberty is coercively enforceable. But then that raises the obvious question: exactly what is such liberty?

None of this is to imply that in everyday usage there is anything inherently wrong or confused about saying, “people should only be coercively prevented from inflicting harm upon each other”. But what if the sense that is clearly intended or implied by the particular use of such an expression is inconsistent with the more precise libertarian criterion that has been outlined here? Then we might need to correct or reinterpret the statement, possibly with an explanation and discussion of the relevant issues involved. It might be said that the account given here just is the libertarian interpretation of “inflicting harm”. But that would appear to be a stipulative and Pickwickian definition rather than an explanation of any normal usage of that expression.

For analogous points see, for instance, ^*act-omission doctrine; ^*initial acquisition.

(This is an entry from A Libertarian Dictionary: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)