Consequentialism, Deontologism, and Libertarianism

consequentialism and deontologism  Consequentialism is the theory that we should judge what is ^*moral only by the maximised good consequences, the ends (however these are conceived and insofar as they can reasonably be determined). This view is especially contrasted with its main moral competitor deontologism (etymologically from “duty”): the theory that the only moral criteria should be the types of behaviour involved, the means. In practice, we are almost bound to choose by reference to either or both depending on the circumstances.

An immediate problem is how far this distinction is coherent. For if we ought to do what maximises some good end, then that is itself a kind of duty that we must obey irrespective of any other—supposedly morally irrelevant or lesser—consequences. And all normal supposed duties usually have good consequences involved: it is not arbitrary that theft and murder are generally thought wrong; they are believed to do overwhelmingly more harm than good. In any case, it appears to be compatible with consequentialism that there be general moral rules—at least for everyday use by ordinary people—as these are needed to minimise uncertainty, ^*corruption, and ^*moral hazard. However, this act-rule distinction is also of dubious coherence: if rules work best then the best act is to follow them; or if we see when it is best to act to break a general rule, then that can be put into a new more-precise rule.

Consequentialism, as such, leaves open which consequences are good in themselves. Logically, virtually anything (and not just one thing) might be judged to be so. But the prime contenders include varying conceptions of ^*utility (especially pleasure, ^*happiness, or preference-satisfaction) as conceptions of ^*welfare. Preference utilitarianism seems more conducive to both ^*libertarianism and ^*economic analysis. By this theory, it is better if people can maximise the satisfaction of their preferences, or wants, irrespective of how this makes them feel: why force people to have more happiness or pleasure if, at least after a certain point, they would rather achieve some other ends? And some people would restrict these consequences to ^*persons as relevantly morally superior to mere beasts (see ^*animal welfare).

A much-discussed problem with consequentialism is how much sense it makes to sum different people’s welfare outcomes. Many deny that this can be ^*scientific or ^*objective and so opt for strict ^*Paretianism. But with strict Pareto comparisons we can never even say that the abolition of the worst kinds of ^*slavery improve general welfare, because of the slave-owners’ supposedly completely incommensurable losses. Instead of Paretianism, some rough and ready comparisons seem to make intuitive sense and are sometimes sufficient to convince us that certain rule-systems promote more welfare than others for the ^*populations that have to live by them. This argument does not entail, as is sometimes alleged, that detailed comparisons must be possible, or even if they were that they could overcome the problem of so-called ^*economic calculation, and so allow for ^*state planning. However, perhaps even such intuitive and broad interpersonal comparisons can be avoided by asking what general rules everyone (or any normal person) would intrapersonally consider themselves better off living by if they might find themselves randomly assigned to anyone’s circumstances. Even considered purely egoistically, allowing slavery to exist then looks like a bad bet: it is not worth the risk of being one of the many slaves for the chance of being one of the relatively few owners of slaves. There is also the issue of the ^*economic ^*inefficiency of slavery.

Libertarians tend to argue that there is, at least, a prima facie ^*right to ^*liberty (mostly in the form of derived ^*property rights), which is logically equivalent to a duty to observe liberty (and one that trumps any other duties and moral obligations); but they also tend to argue that such liberty has the most desirable consequences in terms of want-satisfaction compared to any realistic alternative (although some libertarians do opt strictly for one side or the other). Such liberty-welfare compatibilism has always been a part of classical ^*liberalism. Thus, libertarianism can even be advocated as a form of rule-consequentialism. That libertarian rules appear to maximise both liberty and want-satisfaction welfare can certainly be explained—especially via philosophy and economics—and many libertarians will mistake such explanations for ^*justifications. But it cannot be given epistemological support: it is a conjecture that invites, but appears to survive, ^*criticism.

Nevertheless, in potentially catastrophic circumstances (whether small scale or large), it would seem to be moral to set aside libertarian rights and duties. But even then, this would usually still entail that full ^*restitution is due (as far as this remains possible) for those people whose liberties have been overridden for the alleged greater good (and this should help to curb dubious catastrophe claims).

See also ^*social contract

(This is an entry from A LIBERTARIAN DICTIONARY: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)