Belief and Libertarianism

Belief is never a choice, but dogmatism and bigotry are

belief  The feeling that some proposition (whether considered in words or abstractions) is ^*true. False theories of belief are often used to dismiss unusual views and defend familiar ones, including those about ^*politics. It is a ^*common-sense view that people sometimes “believe what they like”, and that “there are none so blind as those who will not see”. Therefore, it is alleged, it is not worth arguing with such ^*dogmatic, ^*bigoted, or ^*irrational people who, not by coincidence, are often seen as having ^*extreme views and ^*dangerous ideas such as ^*libertarianism. But these views on belief appear to be erroneous and, ironically, often also excuses for the accuser’s own dogmatism or bigotry (it is not clear that irrationality is even possible).

Introspection shows us that we cannot simply choose to believe or disbelieve any proposition, although we can choose to avoid criticisms and counter-arguments or seek only evidence that fits what we believe. Belief is an automatic function of the brain. Consequently, we cannot have a ^*right to believe what we like (if “ought” implies “can”). The phenomena of so-called ^*wishful and fearful thinking are more to do with not giving up too easily when we seek something we value or want to avoid something we disvalue.

If “faith” is intended to mean believing by some act of will, then there is no faith; or if there is, then perhaps there really is insanity (see ^*mental illness). On the other hand, if “faith” is intended to mean only a belief that goes beyond the evidence then, vacuously, every belief is faith; as ^*critical rationalism explains.

We discover what we believe at the moment we consider some matter. And our beliefs are ephemeral and subject to change, sometimes by the moment, by our senses and thoughts. By harmless extension, we also speak of “beliefs” when what we must really be referring to is some disposition to believe certain things: for something cannot actually be being believed if it is not being considered at the time, and a disposition to believe X might not result in belief X when the new consideration occurs. Beliefs are changed immediately by anything that appears to us, however mistakenly, to be a genuine refutation. But arguments often take time to be adequately understood and evaluated, especially when confronting an array of ancillary beliefs that also need to be dealt with. Therefore, it is not illogical or dogmatic to feel that some apparently inconsistent piece of evidence or argument is an anomaly to be explained, unless and until we feel we have adequately tested its strength.

Whether we believe or how strongly we believe some proposition has nothing to do with whether that proposition is true, except in certain special self-referential cases. So, it is usually irrelevant to an argument to question the sincerity or strength of someone’s beliefs (see ^*hypocrisy, ^*opinion). Moreover, although someone’s belief might feel “strong” it has no way to resist a perceived refutation thereby.

The above sense of “belief” is quite distinct from that which would less confusingly be called, ^*moral, ^*value. Someone who expresses his “belief” in ^*anarchy does not mean he believes anarchy already exists. These two senses of belief sometimes appear to be especially conflated in ^*religions. It would be clearer if people saw and said this was a value. However, values are not chosen either. We find out what we value by similar introspection. Hence it is always worth arguing with people (unless they are insufferably insulting or, potentially, violent) if our aim is to intellectually cooperate to find what is true or what is right.

A useful criterion of belief is someone’s behaviour. The expression, “actions speak louder than words” is relevant here. If someone says that he believes X but behaves as though he believes ~X, then that suggests that ~X is his real belief.

(This is an entry from A LIBERTARIAN DICTIONARY: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)