Akrasia (Weakness of Will) and Libertarianism

Another bogus excuse for limiting liberty

akrasia  From the Greek for “no [self] power”. Usually translated as “weakness of will”. But this is in the sense of acting (or attempting to act) against one’s own better—prudential or ^*moral—judgement. It is not in the sense that one is generally lacking in willpower, determination, or resolution. According to Socrates, in Plato’s Protagoras, it is not possible to judge some action to be the best and yet choose not to do it. In essence, because that would be inconsistent. As Socrates puts it at one point, “‘No one’, he declared, ‘who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course’” (Protagoras, 358b–c).

Apparent cases of akrasia can often be explained away in two main ways. 1. One’s stated opinion about what is best is not what one really ^*believes (although one might even be confused enough to believe that one believes it when one does not—even while being a philosopher). And, 2. at the moment of the relevant action one changes one’s normal beliefs because of extreme emotion, intoxication, confusion, etc. It does seem to be ^*a priori necessary that at the moment of performing, or attempting to perform, an action one thinks that to be the best thing to do at that time in those perceived circumstances. That one might immediately regret the action, or not wish to defend it, or even insist that it was due to one’s own akrasia, etc., does not seem to undermine the cogency of the logical point.

There are various relevances to liberty and libertarianism. Perhaps two stand out. 1. Arguments for ^*coercive ^*paternalism that claim to be based on what even the coerced person believes to be the best for himself. 2. Arguments about moral and ^*legal culpability that offer some degree of exculpation because of someone’s temporary and uncharacteristic akrasia.

1. If someone sincerely and, at least, usually believes that behaviour X is always best for himself, then he can—and presumably will—find a way to always do X or to bind himself (possibly ^*contractually) into that behaviour. There is no need to coerce him. There is even less excuse to coerce all the other people for whom behaviour X is a persistent preference (assuming that such behaviour does not ^*initiate impositions on other people, of course). To give a real example: people smoke because, at least at the moments of smoking, they judge the risks to be a price worth paying for the benefits; and if they have a sufficiently strong and persistent opposite view at other times, then they will find some way to stop the activity (such as nicotine gum). See ^*addiction.

2. Even if people were capable of “temporary and uncharacteristic akrasia”, that could not exculpate them from full libertarian ^*rectification. After all, people are rightly liable for full damages resulting from accidents they cause even when we know they were not in any sense intended or reckless. Also, there is a severe ^*moral hazard in allowing people to plead successfully, “I could not help myself”: the relevant undesirable but unrectified activities will increase. In any case, this is especially absurd if we discover (as we often do) that the allegedly akratic person clearly first took pains to avoid detection and only then was he “unable to help himself”.

See ^*rationality.

(This is an entry from A LIBERTARIAN DICTIONARY: Explaining a Philosophical Theory [draft currently being revised]. Asterisks indicate other entries.)